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Abstract:
Purpose: The recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more
recent 2008-09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis
explanation and prediction. This paper provides an analytical review of proxies for and important
determinants of banking crises −credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and
supervision.
Design/methodology/approach: The study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing
proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy-related variables in the literature.
Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.
Findings: Disagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part explained by the
difference in the chosen proxies used in empirical models. The usefulness of different proxies
depend partly on constraints in terms of time and country coverage but also on what particular
policy question is asked.
Originality: The study offers a comprehensive analysis of measurements of banking crises,
credit growth, financial liberalization and banking regulations and concludes with an assessment
of existing proxies and databases. Since the review points to the choice of proxies that best fit
specific research objectives, it should serve as a reference point for empirical researchers in the
banking crisis area.
Keywords: Banking crisis definition, domestic and external financial liberalization, credit
growth, measures of bank regulation
Paper type: General Review
∗
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1. Introduction
The recurrence of financial crises in both advanced and emerging markets throughout the
1980s and 1990s, the recent severe global financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis have led
to an expanding literature on the determinants of financial crises. The literature has grown to
encompass a diversity of crisis types such as: Balance of Payments-, Currency-, Banking-, Debt-,
Inflation-, Stock market- and Real Estate crises. More often than not, they represent different
aspects of the same crisis episodes. Financial crises are of particular concern because they often
have real repercussions on economic growth and employment.
In this paper we focus entirely on banking crises, which are particularly interesting for
two reasons. First, in most countries banks play a dominant role in the financial system,
compared to equity and debt markets. Second, the special characteristics of banks as providers of
liquidity with longer term assets make them vulnerable to bank runs and contagion effects from
interbank positions. In times of financial distress, even a solvent bank may fail to meet its
obligations given the illiquid and opaque nature of its assets. Depositors and other creditors are
often unable to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).
While it has been argued that “blind” bank runs can be mitigated by developing deposit
insurance systems, explicit and implicit deposit guarantees can increase the likelihood of crisis
because they tend to increase banks’ incentives to shift risk to deposit insurance authorities and
taxpayers while reducing the incentives of holders of bank liabilities to monitor the riskiness of
banks’ lending activities. This moral hazard problem can lead to excessive risk-taking on the part
of bankers. Excess risk-taking as a result of explicit and implicit guarantees of depositors and
other creditors seems to have been a central feature in most financial crises in modern times
according to many observers (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).
2

Empirical work on banking crises generally focus on one of two aspects: early warning
signals or factors explaining banking crisis. The signals are typically indicators of
macroeconomic activity such as credit expansion, which often interact with indicators of
“financial fragility”. High fragility implies that the banking system is crisis prone in response to
relatively mild economic downturns or external shocks (see, for example, Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1999). Meanwhile, studies on the determinants of banking crises have identified a
number of policy-related contributing factors such as government-created safety net features for
the banking system (e.g. deposit insurance) and institutional arrangements (e.g. financial
liberalization, financial regulatory structures, quality of supervision, legal systems, and exchange
rate regimes).1
The literature has so far been unable to produce a general consensus on the key causal
factors leading to banking crises. For example, Barth et al., (2006) find that official supervisory
power and stricter capital requirements have no significant effect on banking crisis probabilities,
while Noy (2004), Amri and Kocher (forthcoming) argue the opposite. Angkinand et al., (2010),
and Shehzad and de Haan (2009) find evidence that the direction of the effect of liberalization on
banking crises depends on the strength of capital regulation and supervision. The relationship
among credit growth, financial liberalization and banking crises are similarly subject to
disagreements. We return to these issues in Sections 3 and 4.
Given that these existing studies use different ways of operationalizing both the
dependent and independent variables, one question that naturally arises is to what extent are the
contradictory results driven by differences in chosen proxies? Differences in country samples
and time-period coverage explain some differences in results but the choices of proxies for crisis,
1

See, for example, Angkinand, et al., (2010) on the effect of financial liberalization and bank
regulation on banking crises and Angkinand and Willett (2011) on the impact of exchange rate
regimes.
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liberalization, strength of supervision and credit growth seem to help explain contradictory
results as well.2 This contention was confirmed empirically in a longer working paper version of
this study.3 There, we report on tests of robustness for determinants of banking crises by
changing proxies one by one in estimations for a specific group of countries over a certain period
and a fixed set of macroeconomic controls. For example, strength of capital regulation and
supervision (CRS) as defined by Abiad et al., (2008) has a significant negative effect while an
index constructed by Barth et al., (2006) is not a significant explanatory factor. Similarly, the
choices of proxies for financial liberalization and credit growth affect results. We return to these
findings below.
Motivated by disagreements in the empirical literature, this study surveys existing proxies
and measurements of banking crises and the key crisis determinants. Section 2 focuses on the
definitions and proxies of banking crises. In Sections 3-5, we survey proxies for each of three
important explanatory variables–credit expansion, financial liberalization, and bank capital
regulation and supervision, respectively. Each section also provides a brief literature review as
well as discussion of existing proxies. Section 6 concludes by assessing how the usefulness of
different proxies depends on the objective of the analysis.

2. Definitions and proxies for banking crises
Banking crises can be studied on the country level as well as the bank level. A banking
crisis on the country level refers to a situation when there are bank failures on a large scale in the
financial system. A crisis of an individual bank can be defined more unambiguously but for
2

In cross-country analyses, the difference in empirical findings on the early warnings and
determinants of banking crises could also be driven by the difference in methodologies used.
See, for example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and Davis and Karim (2008) for the
review of different methodologies used in the banking crisis literature.
3
Available at: http://www.cgu.edu/pages/1380.asp.
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policy purposes the country level is obviously more interesting from the point of view of
repercussions on the real economy. On the country level, likelihood of a banking crisis, banking
system instability, lack of banking system soundness and fragility are often used more or less
interchangeably. Banking instability generally has a broader definition than banking crisis.
Instability may refer to disruption in the payment system or volatility of asset prices that
potentially could lead to crises (see, for example, Mishkin 1996).
2.1 Banking crisis on the country level
To identify episodes of banking crises caused by bank runs, data on bank deposits could
in principle be used. Crises originating on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets through the
deterioration of asset values could be identified by studying, for example, non-performing loans
(NPLs). The data for these variables are not available for a long time span and they do not
necessarily reflect or capture widespread bank failures in the banking system. Another reason
why so few studies use NPL data is because the reliability and comparability of the NPL data can
be questioned in a cross country analysis. Most countries have been reluctant to reveal the
existence of severe banking problems in official statistics, and the definition of NPL varies from
country to country although some convergence is ongoing.
Most studies of banking crises on the country level proceed by identifying dates of crises
from explicit events. Generally, crisis episodes are identified based on a combination of
objective data and interviews with experts. In some cases, quantitative data such as decline in
deposit, NPLs and liquidity support are used with subjective judgment to identify the timing of a
crisis event. As summarized in Table 1, the banking crisis data sets using this event-based
approach have been provided in a small number of studies and cover a large number countries as
well as decades. The data usually provide the beginning and ending dates of each crisis episode
in each country.
5

The very first, comprehensive data set using this event-based approach was compiled by
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal, LGS, (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel, CK, (1996, 2002, and
updated by Caprio et al., 2005). Databases are also compiled by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, DD, (1998, and updated in 2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff, RR, (2009). The most
recent studies that provide banking crisis dates including the recent global financial crisis are
Laeven and Valencia’s (LV) studies (2008 and 2010). Dates of banking crisis episodes from
these studies are fairly highly correlated as they are compiled in a similar way and partly
represent refinements of earlier studies. However, there are clearly great scope for judgmental
differences with respect to the beginning and end of crises (see also Barrell et al., 2010). For
example, the dating of the U.S. savings and loan crisis in LGS and DD is from 1980 through
1992, while RR date the same crisis from 1986 through 1993 and CK from 1988 through1991.
LV identify the crisis as a one year crisis which started and ended in 1988.4
[Table 1 here]
Dziobek and Pazarbasiogly (1997) limit the data set to “systemic crises,” wherein
problem banks together hold at least 20 percent of total deposits in a country. Only 24 crises
worldwide are covered in the study. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identify crises based on
existing studies and on the financial press. They include 20 countries from 1970 to mid-1995 in
the study. To avoid dating too early or too late, they identify the peak period when there is the
heaviest government intervention and/or bank closures. The objective of their paper is to
examine the value of a number of macroeconomics variables as signals or leading indicators of
banking crises.5
4

Additional statistical comparisons of the number of banking crisis episodes identified by these
five studies can be found in the working paper version of this paper (see footnote 3).
5
There are few other studies using the event-based approach to identify banking crisis episodes.
Their data have been less frequently used in the literature. For the additional review, see
Kibritcioglu (2002).
6

Existing empirical studies on banking crises employ the banking crisis indicator from the
sources mentioned in Table 1 by assigning a 0/1 dummy for non-crisis and crisis periods. There
are studies pointing out limitations and disadvantages of such data sets. Boyd et al., (2009), for
example, argue that this crisis dating scheme in fact reflects government responses to perceived
crises rather than the onset or duration of adverse shocks to the banking industry. Serwa (2010)
points out that these data sets fail to measure the extent of a crisis. Governments also have great
scope to employ, for example, forbearance to prevent a crisis from erupting.
2.2 Indicators of banking sector fragility and distress of individual banks
A second group of studies in the banking crisis literature uses a continuous scale for
banking crisis based on variables from banks’ balance sheet and market data. The variables
commonly used are NPLs, provision for loan losses, and equity capital in the banking systems.
These variables are more suitable as proxies for risk-taking or fragility in a banking system or an
individual bank since there are no clear trigger points for these variables to indicate a crisis that
is associated with a sudden increase in fiscal and more general economic costs.6
There are a number of proxies for “financial stability”, indices for “financial soundness”
and “financial stress” based on various components of balance sheet and market data for the
banking sector. For example, Corsetti et al., (2001) use NPL as an indicator of financial
instability, but only if there is a presence of a “lending boom.” Das et al., (2004) construct an
index of financial system soundness from the average of the capital ratio and the (inverted) ratio
of NPL to assets. This index is weighted by the credit-to-GDP ratio in order to capture the extent
of financial intermediation in a country.

6

There are also more theory based proxies for risk-taking on the bank level intended to measure
“distance to default.” The Z-score based on accounting data used in Boyd and Graham (1986) or
market data used in Hovakimian et al., (2000) incorporates the capital asset ratio, the return on
assets and the standard deviation of this return.
7

Kibritcioglu (2002) constructs a “financial fragility index” using proxies for liquidity risk
(bank deposits), credit risk (bank credits to the domestic private sector) and exchange rate risk
(foreign liabilities to banks). Illing and Liu (2006) and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) create an
“index of financial stress” using the market data such as the bond spreads for various bond types.
An extreme value of the index is used to identify periods of financial crises. The IMF performs
country studies on the health of the banking system under the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) instituted by the IMF and World Bank (see IMF, 2003). Indicators of the health
of the banking system in each country are presented in these occasional studies. Indicators
included in the financial stress index are falling asset prices, exchange rate depreciation and/or
losses of official foreign reserves, insolvency of market participants, defaults of debtors, rising
interest rates, and increasing volatility of financial market returns. These indicators of financial
stress are used as leading indicators of weaknesses and disruptions of the financial system.
Some of the indicators of financial fragility and stress discussed above build on balance
sheet and market data for individual banks. Thus, proxies for and indicators of bank specific
crises or distress can be constructed from variables like NPL and capital to asset ratios. The zscore as a measure of “distance to default” (see footnote 6) belongs to the bank-specific category.
Market prices on securities issued by individual banks can also be used to extract implicit
probabilities of default. Angkinand et al., (forthcoming) review the timeliness of equity prices,
subordinated debt yields and credit default spreads as indicators of distress of individual banks.
Interest in measures of the contribution of individual bank risk to the likelihood of a
systemic crisis has increased as a result of the recent financial crisis. Fear of contagion from
banks that are “too big to fail” has led to attempts to identify “systematically important financial
institutions” (SIFIs) and their contribution to the likelihood of a crisis.

8

There is no clear consensus on how a bank’s contribution to the systemic risk should be
measured. Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) use variables such as bank size and interbank lending
and borrowing as measures of a bank’s systemic importance. A group of researchers at New
York University have developed an early warning measure geared towards providing a signal for
the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk. This measure, the Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES), is an equity market-based signal and it depends on the volatility of a bank’s
equity price, the correlation with the market return, and the co-movement of the tails of the
distributions. Thus, it is designed to capture special characteristics of the tails of distributions
associated with systemic shocks. The MES is described in Brownlee and Engle (2010).7

3. Measures of Credit Growth
The role of private credit growth has been a source of disagreement within the banking
crisis literature. There are theoretical as well as empirical grounds for the diverging views on
credit booms. Proponents of the predominant view point to the boom-bust credit cycle
explanation, along with distorted incentives to allocate credit away from market-determined
criteria during periods of credit expansion. The story is straightforward: over-optimism about
future earnings (i.e. the boom) boosts asset valuations and the net worth of the firms,
“artificially” inflating their ability to borrow,8 but when profit expectations are unmet (i.e. the
bust), the process is reversed, and banks face serious balance sheet problems. Others (see e.g.
Gourinchas et al., 2001), however, view expansion of credit as a normal phase of financial
development. Far from being a transitory development, Gourinchas et al. argue that credit booms
can be symptomatic of improvements in investing opportunities.
7

Available at: http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/analysis/RISK.USFIN-MR.MES.
This is formally demonstrated by Bernanke et al. (1998) through the financial accelerator
model.
8
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The relationship between rapid credit growth and banking crises remains controversial
although most of the studies listed in Table 2 reveal a link between credit growth and subsequent
crises. One reason is that results vary in multivariate regressions when other, possibly correlated
variables, are included. For example, the significance of credit growth in the empirical model of
Joyce (2010) did not hold when a proxy for financial liberalization was included. This
observation is consistent with Mendoza and Terrones (2008). They show that credit booms were
preceded by financial liberalization in 20 percent of cases. Amri et al. (2011) find that the
interaction between credit growth and financial liberalization is significant in predicting banking
crisis probability but credit growth alone is not.
The main variable used in these studies to construct a credit boom indicator is the ratio of
bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP9 but there are variations in how to operationalize
the “credit boom” variable. One way is to employ a continuous measure of private credit growth,
another to define a dichotomous measure of credit boom episodes. Within the latter group, credit
boom is coded as 1 when there occurs “usually large” credit growth. However, there has been
much debate about what is “unusually large” vis-à-vis “normal” credit growth – whether it can
be captured by the deviation in the growth of credit from its trend, above a certain “normal”
threshold, or the pace of credit growth, as compared with the growth of GDP itself. the deviation
from GDP growth10 – as well as the appropriate statistical filters to employ.
The continuous measure of credit growth has been used in most multivariate logit/probit
banking crisis models with the purpose of estimating the marginal effect of private credit growth
9

Studies generally obtain the data for domestic bank credit to the private sector from two
sources: 1) World Development Indicators and 2) International Financial Statistics (line 22d and
42d). In some studies such as Mendoza and Terrones (2008), this variable is transformed into
“real credit per capita,” by adjusting to consumer price inflation and the total population, while
some others (see Table 2) employ “net domestic credit” which includes bank credit to both the
government and the public sector.
10
This measurement issue is similarly experienced in defining “sudden stops” as discussed in
Sula et al., also in this special issue.
10

on the probability of a banking crisis. The dichotomous measure has been used in frequency
analysis and event studies relating episodes of credit booms and banking crises (Mendoza and
Terrones 2008). Gourinchas et al., (2001) compare probabilities of banking crises before and
after credit boom episodes.
[Table 2 here]

4. Data Sets for Financial Liberalization
Many countries relaxed internal and external restrictions on their financial sectors during
the 1980s and the 1990s. Many argue that financial liberalization lowers the cost of capital and
encourages banks to engage in more risky projects. It has also been argued that increased
competition can make banks become more vulnerable.
Most early studies of the impact of financial liberalization on banking crises focused on
the elimination of interest rate controls (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001 and Weller,
2001). A 0/1 dummy was used to distinguish between periods before and after liberalization. The
literature has later expanded along with databases including liberalization of controls on credit
allocation, external capital flows, equity markets and entry. Eichengreen and Arteta (2002), Noy
(2004), Ranciere et al., (2006) emphasized the difference between the effects of domestic and
external liberalization including relaxation of current and capital account restrictions.11
The disadvantage of a dummy variable for liberalization is that it does not capture the
extent or speed of liberalization. Continuous measures of degrees of financial liberalization
require assumptions about the impact of liberalization on a variable affected by liberalization.

11

Measures of external liberalization, i.e. the degree of capital controls, are discussed in the
paper in this special issue on “International Aspects of Currency Policies” and Potchamanawong
et al., (2008).
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For example, Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) use the ratio of capital flows to GDP as a proxy for
the degree of external liberalization. Bekaert et al., (2005) use market capitalization to capture
the intensity of equity market liberalization. These continuous measures are obviously affected
by a number of factors besides liberalization.
With an increased interest on the study of financial liberalization, scholars have
developed the dichotomous measures of financial liberalization from simple dummies to
incorporate intensity of liberalization. Two recent available databases are constructed by
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) and Abiad et al., (2008). The former includes three-level
financial liberalization indices for capital account controls, interest rate controls, and equity
market restrictions in 28 countries from 1973 through 1999.
The Financial Reforms Database in Abiad et al. (2008) categorizes financial reforms into
seven dimensions each year from 1973-2005.12 Six of them refer to liberalization in the form of
elimination of credit allocation controls, interest rate controls, capital account controls, equity
market controls, entry barriers and privatization while the seventh dimension captures strength of
bank capital regulation and supervision (CRS). The intensity of each reform category is captured
on a four-point scale from fully repressed to fully liberalized for the six dimensions of
liberalization. The CRS-dimension will be discussed in the next section. The data are available
for 98 countries.
The more comprehensive databases have allowed analyses of effects of different types of
liberalization. However, as pointed out by Abiad and Mody (2005) and Angkinand et al.,
(2010), all dimensions of financial liberalization are highly correlated since one type of
liberalization is often accompanied or followed by other types of liberalization. Therefore,
identification of effects of specific types of liberalization can be uncertain. Abiad and Mody
12

The data are availalbe to the public at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=22485.0 (accessed 31 July 2011).
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(2005) use only an aggregate index based on all available categories of financial reforms in their
empirical study. Angkinand et al., (2010) use an aggregate index as well as three types of
liberalization which are grouped based on six financial liberalization variables. They find that
the most important type of liberalizations in associating with an increased likelihood of a
banking crisis is the relaxation of restrictions on banks’ actions and behavior (i.e. relaxation of
interest and credit controls), but this relationship can be clearly distinguished from the effects of
other types of liberalization only when it is conditioned on the strength of capital regulation and
supervision (CRS) in the domestic banking system.
Finally we note that recent studies by Angkinand et al., (2010) and Shehzad and de Haan
(2011) do not confirm the conventional wisdom that financial liberalization always increases the
likelihood of banking crises. The former study finds that the likelihood of crises is at a
maximum with partial liberalization while the latter finds that after some reform additional
reforms lead to more stable financial systems. In the next section we will see how these results
from these two studies are modified by interaction between liberalization and CRS.

5. Data sets for Bank Regulation and Supervision
Several studies investigate the effects of bank regulation and supervision on banking
crises. These effects can be direct or captured by interaction between regulation or supervision
and other variables like deposit insurance coverage or financial liberalization.
The variables directly measuring bank regulation and supervision are available only from
few data sources. There are related proxies for the quality of countries legal systems and
bureaucracy. These proxies have greater coverage of countries and periods and they are likely to
be highly correlated with effectiveness of regulation and supervision of banking systems. The
databases commonly used in the literature are the following:
13

i. The World Bank’s Regulation and Supervision of Banks around the World: a New
Database, compiled by Barth, Caprio, Levine (2006) (the World Bank survey)
ii. Financial Reforms database from Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2008), International
Monetary Fund (the variable called Enhancement of capital regulations and prudential
supervision of the banking sector)
iii. International Country Risk Guide, ICRG (the variables include law and order,
corruption, bureaucratic quality) 13
The first database is the most commonly used as it is available for more than 140
countries, but the data availability is currently limited to three survey years; 1999, 2003 and
2005. One advantage of the World Bank survey database is that it comprises of a large number of
survey questions on how bank are regulated and supervised. Different aspects of regulation and
supervision can be studied. The database includes questions on restrictions on bank activities,
formal supervisory powers, ownership, organization, accounting and disclosure. The different
dimensions can be objectively defined. Studies using this database generally create a composite
index from a certain number of related survey questions to capture the extent of banking
regulation to serve the purpose of their studies.
The Financial Reforms Database provides data for the six types of financial liberalization
discussed above as well as for “Enhancement of capital regulations and prudential supervision of
the banking sector” (CRS). The scale of this variable goes from 0-3 where 0 = unregulated and
unsupervised and 3 = strongly regulated and supervised. This data set is available annually from
1973-2005 for 91 countries. However, this database provides more limited aspects of banking
regulation and supervision than the first database. It has only one dimension and is based on
13
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assessment of available information from different countries. Thus, it has a judgmental
component.14
We compare the data for CRS variables from the two mentioned sources by country
group in Table 3. The data refers to 2005, the latest World Bank survey year. We construct an
index from the three World Bank survey questions that are comparable to the components of
CRS in the Financial Reforms database.
Table 3 shows that on average the Financial Reforms database assigns a higher value of
CRS to developed countries, a lower value for emerging market economies, and the lowest value
for other less-developed countries. The World Bank survey, on the other hand, ranks the group of
other less-developed countries above emerging markets in terms of having better bank regulation
and supervision. The correlation between the two variables is as low as 0.4.
[Table 3 here]
Turning to the proxies for legal system and institutional quality, the most widely used
variables in the banking crisis literature include Law and Order, Corruption, Bureaucratic
Quality from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data are available for more than
150 countries and from 1984, and have been continuously updated. Other variables and sources,
which have been less frequently used, in part due to the limited number of country and/or period
coverage, are the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom index, the Heritage Foundation’s Index
of Economic Freedom, the Worldwide Governance Indicators by Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi
(2009). The real GDP per capita is also used in some studies as proxy the general quality of
domestic institutions. All these proxies reflect only general aspects of quality of institutions, and
they may not directly measure bank regulation and supervision in the specific way researchers
14

For other sources of bank regulation data sets, Neyapti and Dincer (2005) develop an index of
Legal Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision. They identify a total of 98 criteria related to
the quality of banking regulation and code them using information retrieved from actual banking
laws. However, we do not find that their data sets have been used in existing studies.
15

desire. However, the advantage of using the proxies from ICRG and GDP per capita is that they
allow time series analysis. The general trend of institutional quality over time is positive
although there are periods of reversals in some countries. The trend for CRS in the Financial
Reform database is positive as well.
Given the relatively low correlation in cross-section between the two data sets for CRS it
is not surprising that researchers come to different conclusions regarding the relationship
between banking crisis and strength of regulation and supervision. For example, Barth et al.,
(2006) find that the probability of banking crises is reduced in countries with a high quality of
law and order but not in countries with relatively strong CRS as measured by the World Bank
survey. However, Angkinand et al., (2010) find that CRS from the Financial Reforms Database
reduces the likelihood of banking crises in a cross-section time-series analysis. Barrell et al.,
(2010) also conclude that bank regulation and supervision reduce banking crisis probabilities for
the sample of 14 OECD countries from 1980-2007. Their conclusion is based on continuous
variables for the capital adequacy and liquidity ratios in banking systems. They do not observe
significant effects for OECD countries of other proxies from Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi
(governance variable), the Heritage Foundation (banking- and economic freedom index), and the
World Bank survey database (selected banking regulatory variables). Klomp (2010) does not
find any evidence that a credit market regulations index from the Fraser Institute has a
significant impact on the stability of the banking sector.
Turning finally to the interaction between strength of regulation and supervision, and
financial liberalization Shehzad and De Haan (2009) find that a positive impact on financial
stability is conditional on adequate supervision. Similarly, Angkinand et al., (2010) find that the
decline in likelihood of banking crisis associated with increased liberalization occurs only in

16

countries with strong capital regulation and supervision. In countries with weak regulation and
supervision the effect of liberalization is the opposite.

6. Assessment of usefulness of existing proxies and conclusions
The analytical review and comparisons of various proxies for banking crises, as well as
important banking crisis determinants–credit expansion, financial liberalization, and bank
regulation and supervision–show that differences between proxies explain some contradictory
results in the literature, as well as differences in sensitivity of the likelihood of banking crises to
changes in explanatory factors. Understanding of the construction of different proxies can help
the researcher choose the relevant proxy for the research objective in cross-country and timeseries analyses. Thus, the usefulness of a particular proxy depends on the research objective. We
emphasize the following observations with respect to different variables:
• Banking crises: Data for crisis dates, which are available in few studies, are compiled in a
similar way and sometimes draw upon one another. Banking crisis episodes from the available
data sources are highly correlated but there are differences as a result of differences in judgment
about what defines a crisis. The researcher concerned primarily with very costly systemic crisis
should choose the most restrictive crisis proxy. Differences in beginning and end dates of crises
matter less as long as one crisis is considered one observation whether it lasts one or three years.
It is obviously necessary to consider country and time coverage; statistical significance may have
to be traded off against appropriateness of proxy.
A fruitful area of research is the analysis of the relation between market-based measures
of probability of distress and other proxies for distress of individual banks as well as for systemic
crises.

17

• Credit expansion: A continuous measure captures simply the growth of private bank
credit while dichotomous measures place emphasis on identification of lending boom episodes.
The former measure seems most appropriate for studies using continuous proxies for probability
of crisis rather than 0/1 crisis dummies, and for tests of theoretical hypotheses with respect to
determinants and effects of credit growth. The dichotomous measures are associated with much
debate about the identification of “excess” credit growth relative to the growth endogenously
associated with the economy’s performance. There is scope for theoretical as well as empirical
research on this issue.
• Financial liberalization: Attempts to measure financial liberalization have progressed
from simple dichotomous measures to indices capturing a number of dimensions and degree of
liberalization over time. Although the recently constructed comprehensive data sets, e.g. the IMF
Financial Reforms database in Abiad et al., (2008) allow researchers to study the effects of
different types of liberalization, the different types are highly correlated since most countries
have moved towards greater liberalization. Moving away from simple dichotomous measures has
led to results contradicting the conventional wisdom that liberalization contributes to the
likelihood of banking crises. One remaining challenge is to be able to identify effects of different
types of liberalization in order to produce meaningful policy implications with respect to effects
of financial liberalization policies.
• Bank regulation and supervision: there are tradeoffs in the choice between available
proxies for strength of regulation and supervision. The data from the World Bank survey of bank
regulation and supervision by Barth et al., (2006) consist of objective measures of many
dimensions of regulation and supervision. Thus, they seem to be appropriate for studies of effects
of specific reforms. The Financial Reform Database covers fewer dimensions but include
informal judgment about effectiveness of regulation and supervision. Another trade-off exists
18

because the World Bank Survey data exist only for three years so far. The literature commonly
assumes that bank regulations rarely change over time, but the proxies for bank regulation and
institutional quality from other data sources show otherwise.
Finally we note that results with respect to the effects of financial liberalization and
strength of regulation and supervision on banking crises are strongly affected by interaction
between these variables. We suspect that banking crises are influenced by interaction between
these variables and credit growth as well.
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There are runs or otherwise substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of
financial firms and/or massive government intervention. Two general
classes are identified: “significant” or “crisis”.

The dataset is based on data for loan losses and the erosion of bank
capital, interviews with experts, and judgment whether an episode
constitutes a crisis. A banking crisis episode is identified as: “systemic” or
“non-systemic”. In a systemic crisis, much or all of bank capital is
exhausted. In a non-systemic or borderline crisis, a subset of banks
indicates a banking problem such as a large-scale of government
intervention.
Identifies, dates and updates episodes using above studies and others. One
of the following conditions must be satisfied for a crisis to be identified:
(i) the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets in the banking system
exceeds 10 percent, (ii) the costs of rescue operation exceeds 2 percent of
GDP, (iii) there was large scale nationalization of banks, or (iv) there were
extensive runs or emergency measures to prevent runs were taken (deposit
freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or blanket guarantees of deposits).
Banking crisis episodes are identified based on (i) bank runs that lead to
the closure, merging or take over by the public sector of one or more of
the financial institutions, or (ii) when no bank runs occur, but there is a
closure, merging, take-over or large-scale government assistance of an
important financial institutions followed by similar outcomes for other
financial institutions.
Banking crisis episodes are identified based on (i) deposit runs, (ii)
introduction of deposit freeze/blanket guarantee, (iii) extensive liquidity
support, (iv) bank interventions/bank takeovers, or (v) high proportion of
non-performing loans (NPL) which translates into loss of most of the
capital in the system.

Caprio et al., (2005)
updates Caprio and
Klingebiel’s 1996, 2002
studies

Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (2005)
updates their 1998 study

Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009)

Laeven and Valencia
(2008, 2010)

Criteria for episode of banking system problem

Lindgren, Garcia and
Saal (1996)

Study

Table 1. Main Data Sources for Banking Crises at the Country Level

123 countries experiencing 145
episodes

66 countries experiencing 108
episodes

62 countries experiencing 83 crises

160 banking crisis episodes in all
countries. 46 episodes are classified as
systemic crises.

133 out of 181 IMF members
experienced a banking sector problem.
106 episodes were considered
“significant”, and 41 episodes in 36
countries were classified as “crisis”.

Country coverage and banking
problem episodes

1973-2008
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1800-2009
(but only data
from 1970 are
used)

1980-2003

1970s-2003

Period
coverage
1980-1996

Table 2. Measures of Credit Growth in the Banking Crisis Literature
Measures of
credit
1.Real credit per
capita: Real credit is
the average of two
contiguous end-ofyear values, deflated
by the end-of-year
consumer price
index.
2. Real domestic
credit to the private
sector credit to
GDP ratio: credit is
financial resources
provided to the
private sector, such
as through loans,
purchases of nonequity securities,
and trade credits
and other accounts
receivables.

Data source

Authors

Binary or
continuous
binary variable, set
using standard
Hondrik-Prescott
(HP) Filter

Findings

International
Financial
Statistics
(IFS)

Mendoza &
Terrones (2008)

World
Development
Indicators
(WDI)

Gourinchas et al
(2001)

Binary variable, set
using expanding
HP Filter

WDI

Borio and
Drehman (2009)

Binary variable, set
using rolling HP
filter

WDI

Joyce (2010),
Demirguc-Kunt
& Detragiache
(1998).

Continuous
variable: one year
growth of private
credit to GDP ratio.

3. Real domestic
private credit
growth/real GDP
growth, three years
prior to a banking
crisis.

WDI

Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996)

Dummy variable
=1 if the variable is
between 0-2.5%.

The link is tenuous.
Most banking crises are
preceded by lending
booms, but most lending
booms are not followed
by a banking crisis.
In 18 industrial countries
(1980-2008), sharp
increases in both credit
and asset prices precede
banking crises.
Using panel logit/probit
models, an increase in
credit growth
significantly leads to an
increase in the
probability of a banking
crisis.
Positive link between
rapid credit growth and
crises applies to Latin
America, but not when
considering a larger set
of countries.

3. Net domestic
credit: the sum of
net credit to the
nonfinancial public
sector, credit to the
private sector, and
other accounts.

WDI

Eichengreen and
Arteta (2002)

Continuous
variable, not
weighted by GDP.

Credit booms coincide
with or precede banking
crises in both advanced
and emerging markets.

In 75 emerging markets
(1975-97), credit growth
is positive and
significantly related to
banking crisis
probabilities.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on studies cited in text, WDI and IFS.
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Table 3. Comparison of Bank Regulation Data
The World Bank survey
(Barth, Caprio and Levine)

Developed economies
Emerging market economies
Other less developed countries
All countries

0.82
0.74
0.78
0.78

Financial Reforms
Database
(Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel)

0.89
0.65
0.55
0.68

Note: the data in the table are average values of the capital regulation and supervision (CRS) variable in 2005
by country group. The CRS variable in the third column is from the Financial Reforms database by Abiad et al.,
(2008).The CRS variable in the second column is constructed based on the comparable survey questions from the
World Bank survey by Barth et al., (2006). See the working version of this paper for detail explanations.
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